Phenomenological Language and the Description of Visual Space

Abstract
Questions about measurement in visual space play a central role in the description in the secondary literature of Wittgenstein’s abandonment, in October 1929, of his brief project of a phenomenological language. It is also central in defining what is phenomenology in this context. Furthermore, the interpretation of the problems set out in Chapter XX of Philosophical Remarks directly relates to some interpretations of the project that lies at the basis of the book. We propose here to review this debate taking K. Nielsen’s reading as a paradigmatic instance and to clarify the difficulties associated with it. It will enable our outlining an alternative approach to Philosophical Remarks, Chapter XX, and, with it, to the project that lies at the basis of the book.

Keywords: Philosophical Remarks . Visual Space . Measurement . Phenomenology . Middle Wittgenstein

Resumo
As questões a respeito da medida no espaço visual desempenham um papel central na descrição que se encontra na literatura secundária a respeito do abandono por Wittgenstein, em outubro de 1929, de seu breve projeto de construção de uma linguagem fenomenológica. Mais do que isto, a interpretação do conjunto de problemas apresentados no capítulo XX das Anotações Filosóficas está diretamente associada a determinadas interpretações do projeto que se situa na base deste livro. Propõe-se aqui uma revisão do tema a partir da exposição do problema por K. Nielsen e, a partir de um comentário das dificuldades associadas a esta leitura, o esboço de uma leitura alternativa do capítulo XX das Anotações Filosóficas e, a partir dele, do projeto que estrutura o livro.


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1. Introduction

Wittgenstein, in his writings of the beginning of 1929, immediately after his return to Cambridge, supposed that the best way to deal with the project of a complete logical analysis presented in the *Tractatus*, and with the concept of simple names and objects which seemed to be a condition to this analysis, was to construct what he named a “phenomenological language”. This phenomenological project, in its initial form, was abandoned in October 1929, in the course of an extremely intense period of work\(^1\). This project, its problems, the objections to it, and the consequences of its abandonment are presented by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Remarks*, a typescript prepared in the beginning of 1930 as an exposition of his works in this period which was presented to Russell, who wrote a fellowship report to Trinity College. Nevertheless, the resulting typescript, TS 209, is not simply a collection of notes from 1929-30. It is the outcome of an intense process of selecting and editing his previous material, which, while maintaining an irregular structure (sometimes with a long series of remarks about what seem to be secondary problems, sometimes without making the reasons for the arrangement of different themes clear), it is a pondered presentation of his conceptions in the beginning of 1930. Wittgenstein usually took previous notes out of their context and used them to present conceptions which are, not infrequently, quite different from the ones to which they were initially related. With this in mind, it is relevant to consider the possibility that the *Philosophical Remarks* is (a) the result of a clear structure proposed by Wittgenstein, and (b) a reasonably homogeneous presentation of Wittgenstein’s conceptions in a particular and relevant moment of his work, with its difficulties and strong tensions. This perspective is presented here by means of a limited example, the problems about the description of visual space presented in Chapter XX of the book, and, in a more general approach, the “phenomenological chapters”, XX-XXII.

There are some main interpretations about this period of Wittgenstein’s work and about the reasons for the succession of changes that can be observed in the early 1930s. This debate, interesting by itself and presenting some relevant elements to the reading both of the *Tractatus* and the

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1 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, §1: “I do not now have phenomenological language, or ‘primary language’ as I used to call it, in my mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary. All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language”.
Philosophical Investigations, has as its main point the identification of the reasons for Wittgenstein’s conclusion that a phenomenological language is not “possible” or “necessary”, as stated in the beginning of TS209. According to Keld Nielsen, for instance\(^2\), the problems about the description of visual space presented by Wittgenstein in the early pages of MS107 (27-36)\(^3\) and reproduced as part of Chapter XX of the Philosophical Remarks (§§208b-210) play a central role in his revision of the project of a phenomenological language. In fact, more than a central role, Nielsen sustains that this text presents the reasons for Wittgenstein’s change of direction in his investigations. Consequently, Nielsen criticizes the organization of TS209 (Philosophical Remarks), since these arguments, named by him “the phenomenological language argument”, presented only in the end of the typescript, are presupposed for a clear understanding of the first pages of the “book”, where the possibility of a phenomenological language is refused.

Nielsen’s interpretation of Chapter XX shows the central role that the understanding of Wittgenstein’s conceptions about visual space may play in the description of what led him to abandon the project of a phenomenological language, to the construction of the calculus concept of language, and to an overall description of the Philosophical Remarks\(^4\). We will follow here a brief review of Nielsen’s reading and an example of a frequent reading of the phenomenological problems presented in the Philosophical Remarks, and consider some alternatives to the main interpretation of Philosophical Remarks, XX and of Wittgenstein’s phenomenological project in the early 1930s.

2. Nielsen and the Phenomenological Language Argument

Nielsen’s interpretations of Wittgenstein’s phenomenological investigations in 1929, presented in an entire chapter of his book, may be divided in two different hypotheses, a historical and a theoretical one. They are followed by


\(^4\) This central role is also attributed by L. Soutif’s Wittgenstein et le problème de l’espace visuel and M. Engelmann’s Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Development. Cf. the different position of B. Prado Neto’s Fenomenologia em Wittgenstein, and G. Ghisoni’s A Temporalidade no Argumento da Linguagem Privada de Wittgenstein.
some conclusions about the relation that these texts supposedly maintain to the debate about the possibility of a private language (which, properly, is present only in Wittgenstein’s latter work). 5

The historical hypothesis is about the changes in Wittgenstein’s conceptions between 1929 and 1930. According to him, the problem that Wittgenstein faces in the beginning of 1929 is about “how is visual space to be described, and how will ordinary, physicalistic language be related to that description?”. 6 The first moment of his reflections is to be found in MS105, MS106, and in the first pages of MS107. There, Wittgenstein supposes that it is possible to construct a phenomenological language which “speaks directly about the immediate”, with which he intended to solve the problems left open by the Tractatus, about the nature of the simple objects that are found in the end of analysis: the simple objects constituting the immediately given, the phenomenological language establishes the relation between language and reality. 7

However, during 1929 Wittgenstein struggled with this conception, and his failure to solve some problems related to such phenomenological language drove him to give up the supposition of its possibility. With it, he also gave up the core of the Tractatus, the conceptions that “elementary sentences map into elementary states of affairs” 8 and that all sentences could be analyzed down to elementary sentences. More precisely, Nielsen says that in the beginning of MS107, in some undated remarks, Wittgenstein still claims that there is a phenomenological language. But in a latter remark in that same manuscript, from October 22, 1929, he supposedly makes clear that he does not accept this supposition any more. 9 Consequently, the arguments and problems that “dramatically” drove Wittgenstein to resign his position should be found in the few pages of the beginning of MS107 (written before October, 1929).

6 K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, p. 29
7 “Reality here meant the world as it presented itself to us in immediate experience”, K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, p. 31.
9 “The assumption that a phenomenological language is possible, and that only it would express what we in philosophy must/want to say, is – I think – absurd. We must learn to live with our everyday language and only understand it correctly. That is, we must not allow it to lead us to speak nonsense”. Wittgenstein, Wiener Ausgabe, V. 2, p. 102 (MS107, 176); Nielsen’s translation.
Wittgenstein’s “desperate struggle” to defend the Tractatus’ conceptions, apparently dependent on the possibility of a language that describes the immediately given, is a central part of this narrative, and could also be found in Wittgenstein’s dictates to Schlick and Waismann, in Vienna, done in the last days of that year.

As already said, from this description follows a direct critique to the structure that Wittgenstein presents in TS 209 (Philosophical Remarks). Since these remarks (from MS107) are presented only in Chapter XX, Nielsen concludes that it is impossible to the reader to understand that they are the reason for the important remarks against the possibility of a phenomenological language presented in the beginning of the book.

The central points of this reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s paths in 1929 may be summed in the following terms: (a) his project was to construct a phenomenological language as primary language, to which was possible to “reduce” physicalistic language; (b) this phenomenological language was presupposed by the tractarian assumption that elementary sentences can be completely analysed in terms of elementary states of affairs; (c) in the remark of October 22nd, Wittgenstein makes clear that he abandoned the project of a phenomenological language, conceiving now that there is only one, physicalistic, language; and (d) the difficulties and reasons for his change of mind are to be found in the text of MS107, before the remark of October 22nd. The central debate that Nielsen finds there, and which he presents as the main reason for Wittgenstein’s revision of his project, about measurement in visual space, concerns the so-called non-Euclidian character of the visual space.

Nielsen’s theoretical hypothesis, by its turn, results of his exposition of MS107 28-34 and of some other texts, which he conceives as related to it. In the core of this exposition is a series of considerations Wittgenstein makes about visual space “imprecision”, or about its non-Euclidian character, and the consequent impossibility of a phenomenological language (Nielsen calls this “the crucial elements of Wittgenstein’s reasoning about visual space”). The argument starts with the following problem:
It is obviously possible for the intervals $a$ and $b$ to appear to me to be the same in length and for the segments $c$ and the segments $d$ also to appear to me to be the same in length but for there still to be 25 $cs$ and 24 $ds$ when I count them. And the question arises: how can that be possible? Is it correct to say here: but it is so, and all we see is that visual space does not obey the rules of – say – Euclidian space?

According to Nielsen, what follows this remark is a series of “desperate attempts” made by Wittgenstein, in an “exhaustive fashion”, to explain this apparent paradox and to give a phenomenological description of visual space (of this “empirical fact’ that needs to be explained). First, there is the hypothesis that visual space is non-Euclidian, but it is abandoned because, according to Nielsen, it makes the whole idea of a description absurd. He says that Wittgenstein also refuses other alternatives: distinguishing between appearance and being in what is given, or supposing an absolute appearance. A last try is to avoid the distinction between appearance and being but Wittgenstein realizes that it was still necessary to use other related terms.

“In the end”, the solution supposedly made explicit by Wittgenstein in his dialog with Schlick and Waismann on December 25-30, 1929 is to introduce a contrive and abandon the project of a phenomenological language. Wittgenstein realizes that to describe the given, “one needs a distinction between sein and schein” which is not available in visual space, but only in physical, Euclidian space.

Therefore, Wittgenstein, concluding that it is necessary to distinguish between being and appearance, which is not possible in a phenomenological language, which has nothing hypothetical, affirms the precedence of physicalistic language. A phenomenological language is not possible since it leads to an absurd and so there is only one, physicalistic, language. The “upshot” is that visual space is spoken of as physical objects, but their appearance is absolute.

Wittgenstein’s reasoning in these pages and his abandonment of the hypothesis of a phenomenological language are then guided by two premises: (i) that language must be Euclidian, meaning with this expression, curiously, that it “should obey some kind of logic”, and (ii) that phenomenological words are, by definition, exempt of hypothetical content (mistakes are

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10 “This [that the visual space and the objects in it have a non-Euclidian structure] would dispel the air of paradox, but it is not a solution available to Wittgenstein at this point, because it makes the whole idea of a description absurd.” K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, p. 32
not possible). These assumptions lead (directly) to the conclusion that to give an account of a mistake in visual perception, (as the supposition that 24c=25d – which must be false, according to i, above) it is necessary to distinguish between being and appearance, to relate the description of the “immediate” to something else (and it is understood by Nielsen as the refusal of the possibility of a phenomenological language). Consequently (this is how Nielsen’s comment ends), Wittgenstein “realized that the commitments you make when you make a claim are not […] necessarily true when the claim relates directly to visual space”. In visual space, “something can have two lengths or two colors”\(^\text{11}\). Nielsen seems to present Wittgenstein’s argument as a dilemma: either we abandon the idea of a phenomenological language, or we are obliged to accept that visual space is non-Euclidian and does not respect any “logic”, particularly the principle of contradiction. Things being so, Wittgenstein’s abandonment of his initial project of a phenomenological language, and of the claim that the phenomenological language is primary language, was a consequence of the difficulties in the description of measurement in visual space presented in Chapter XX.

In his reconstruction of these problems and of Wittgenstein’s arguments, Nielsen also intends to present the relation between them and the private language problem. It is presented as a “phenomenological language argument”. According to him,

Wittgenstein was still caught up in a picture of the connection of language and reality being a private affair of the subject’s own.\(^\text{12}\)

In such a way that his “reasons for changing his mind” (those presented in Philosophical Remarks, 208-210) “came from problems he saw with what was essentially a private language”\(^\text{13}\):

But if reality is constituted by what is immediately given in experience, the impossibility of a primary phenomenological language effectively excludes this account of the bridge between ordinary language and reality; there is no final analysis.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{11}\) K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, pp. 34-35
\(^\text{13}\) K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, p.28
\(^\text{14}\) K. Nielsen, The Private Language Argument, p. 36.
In his view, the impossibility of a phenomenological language becomes a "private language problem", because Wittgenstein had, essentially, failed to move beyond the position in which the confrontation between language and reality was a private affair; privacy was still very much a hallmark of this theory.\(^{15}\)

3. Philosophical Remarks, XX

In the core of Nielsen’s analysis is his understanding of a fragment from MS107 which is also present in the *Philosophical Remarks* (208-210). Beyond some minor differences, the text in this chapter of the Remarks is a reordering of Wittgenstein’s previous notes, which gives the text a new use through the new relations established among them. An overview of this use is an interesting starting point to evaluate what the problem they face is.

We may identify three successive moments in Chapter XX, to which follows a brief conclusion. More than an assemblage of remarks about the phenomenology of visual space, its arguments clarify the evolution of Wittgenstein’s conceptions about the relation between visual and Euclidian space:

1. An investigation of the different multiplicity between visual space’s and Euclidian space’s (§§205-207) use of the concepts of “simple, absolute position”, and in the relation between space and colors. The origin of these texts is mainly MS105.

2. A detailed treatment of a particular case of this difference in multiplicity: the measurement problem (§§208-211). The problems we find here are similar to the ones considered in 205-207 but their relevance and the extension of their treatment by Wittgenstein make them a singular step of the text. Their origins are also more diverse than that of the earlier material: MS107, pp. 28-36, 212, 168 and 171-173.

3. The conclusion that it is necessary to use new concepts to deal with these problems, and the brief analysis of some examples about the peculiarity of our use of these concepts; it is followed by a criticism of the concept of sense-datum (§§212-216). This text comes from the manuscript that follows the earlier one (MS107, 173-4 e 161-164), and then comes a long and uninterrupted piece from MS108, 31, 39-45.

4. The last paragraph, 217, which also comes from a continuous piece, with some minor cuts (MS107, 165-170), presents a kind of synthesis of the previous paragraphs.

The first step, §§205 to 207, presents various differences between visual space and the geometrical representation of space (the Euclidean or physical space, as it is also named), which shows the limits of this representation and the “different multiplicity” between them. These paragraphs present some possibilities (and impossibilities) inscribed in the structure of the phenomenon, in visual space.

Wittgenstein considers four different and related problems. They have in common precisely the different multiplicity of these phenomena in comparison to ordinary language. §205 presents the difference between a geometrical analysis of space, in which the concepts of simple and composite have a “relative meaning” (“The larger geometrical structure isn’t composed of smaller geometrical structures, any more than you can say that 5 is composed of 3 and 2”), and visual space, where

the figure □ □ is actually composed of the components □ □, even though the purely geometrical figures of the larger rectangle is not composed of the figures of the two squares.

In a similar way (that makes the reason for their approximation in TS209 clear), §206 presents the existence of “absolute position” as a structural character of visual space without which “there would be no sense in speaking in this context of different places” (which seems to be opposed to a geometrical description of space).

The short §207 shows that “there isn’t a relation of ‘being situated’ which would hold between a color and a position, in which it ‘was situated’”, in such a way that “the forms color and visual space permeate one another”.

In §208, we find important considerations regarding use of the concept of measurement (and, therefore, of equality) in visual space which have essentially the same nature of those found in §§ 205-207. The main problem

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17 Wittgenstein, MS105, 41 and 53.
here is to understand in what sense things that are of an equal length (or are parallel, etc) in visual space are not equal (or parallel) in Euclidian space, and how the concept of measurement relates to visual space. However, this problem of the measure receives a careful and detailed treatment. It fits into the broader context given by the initial problems, but the issues about measurement are more difficult to treat. Nonetheless, what is intended to be shown is ultimately equivalent to what is presented in the brief §207 on the colors: Euclidian geometry is a representation of space that does not present adequately essential characteristics of visual space. We should differentiate what is possible (and necessary) in a representation (physical or Euclidian) and what is possible (and necessary) in visual space, in the space of colors, in hearing, etc..

To the extent that this difference between what happens in the visual space and Euclidian geometry is a difference between what makes sense to say in each of these cases, it is presented by Wittgenstein as a difference of multiplicity: Euclidian representation of space does not have a multiplicity which fits visual space - so that not everything that is necessary in Euclidian geometry is also necessary in visual space, and not everything that is possible in visual space is possible in Euclidian space (a circle in visual space, for example, is not necessarily a circle in Euclidian space).

This debate, even if it involves sensitive and difficult issues, as Wittgenstein himself insists in pointing out throughout the text, can be found at the core of his work since the beginning of 1929. The succession of models of representation that we find in these texts, especially in the debate about the colors, explains that the investigation can be characterized as seeking at the same time to identify the phenomenological characteristics that do not fit into a specific representation (the colors of the octahedron, for example) and to determine a more suitable representation of the phenomena involved.

Therefore, these initial paragraphs of Chapter XX present the particular character that the use of the concepts of composite, (absolute) position, the position of a color, measure and equality have when they refer to visual space. The point seems to be to show that in all these cases the structure of the phenomenon presents a different multiplicity. In other words, that the (logical) investigation of the visual space presents a series of (logical) possibilities and impossibilities which cannot be known otherwise. The project here still is correcting ordinary language through a phenomenological analysis.
4. The Multiplicity of Visual Space (Philosophical Remarks, §§208-212)

In fact, in the almost famous note from October 22, 1929 Wittgenstein makes explicit that he did not conceive any further the possibility of a phenomenological language (MS107, 176). Moreover, it is uncontroversial that he sustained this possibility at least until the middle of 1929, when he wrote Some Remarks on Logical Form. Consequently, he changed his position while writing the end of MS106 and MS107. However, the reasons for this change do not seem to be those indicated by Nielsen. In fact, even if Nielsen’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments about measurement presented in MS107 (27-36) were acceptable, from this does not seems to follow the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language without the simultaneous abandonment of any investigation or reference to an immediately given, which, in fact, does not happen: we still find a chapter on phenomenology in the Big Typescript, from 1933.

Suppose we accept that we have a dilemma here: either we abandon the hypothesis of a phenomenological language, or we are obliged to accept that in visual space c=d & 24c=25d (and, consequently, to refuse Euclidian geometry, which is not, according to Nielsen, in question). The consequence of this is not “simply” the impossibility of a phenomenological language, but the *reductio ad absurdum* of the phenomenon: instead of the project of correcting ordinary language through a phenomenological investigation, the consequence seems to be a correction of the immediately given through Euclidian geometry, since it presents itself to us as illogical.

In fact, what could these arguments show us? Certainly not the falsity of visual space or the refusal of an immediately given. According to Nielsen’s description, the difficulty presented by Wittgenstein is that

the commitments you make when you make a claim are not, as he had first hoped, necessarily true when the claim relates to visual space. For example, if you claim a rod has a certain length, you also commit yourself to holding that it is not of another length. But in visual space, something can have two lengths or two colors.¹⁸

This implies that the arguments presented by Wittgenstein in MS107 result not only in the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language,

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but also in the abandonment of the supposition of an immediately given and of a phenomenological investigation. But this is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s overall conception in the *Philosophical Remarks* and is particularly incompatible with his maintenance of a phenomenological investigation after 1929.

Beyond this, the impossibility of a distinction between appearance (seeming) and reality in visual space is not a problem: it is exactly what its immediate, non-hypothetical, character means, the supposition with which Wittgenstein’s considerations in 1929 begin. And it’s also not the case of claiming the incompatibility between a Euclidian space and the non-Euclidian character of visual space. Wittgenstein’s phenomenological project, from its beginning, intends precisely to make clear that there are such differences.

The argument in *Philosophical Remarks*, §§208-210, notwithstanding its paradoxical character, is not a dilemma and Wittgenstein refuses the paradoxical conclusion that 24=25 for other reasons. This may be elucidated by a further reading of Wittgenstein’s own treatment of the paradox of the “apparent” equality of *a* and *b*, of *c* and *d*, of *a* and 24*c*, of *b* and 25*d*, and the “impossibility” that 24*c*=25*d*.

5. Measurement in Visual Space

The debate about measurement in visual space begins with three examples that do not seem to involve major difficulties, but which make explicit some differences between visual and Euclidian space.

First, the concept of distance is immediately given in visual space, but not by means of a structure containing a distance that is subsequently attached to it. This seems to imply that, for example, common problems of geometry, such as discovering the relation between the measure of two segments *a* and *b*, are not conceivable in visual space, because the segment cannot be conceived without its dimension being immediately given (we see that *a* is smaller than *b*).
The second argument establishes that a measure remains the same even when the yardstick isn’t there, and, therefore, relates (in an essential way) the idea of measurement to duration in time.

Finally, the third initial argument establishes that if CC is between AA, CC is between BB, but only if they are delimited by colors. It relates geometrical transitivity to something that is not in geometry: the delimitation of colors (which brings us back to §205, and can be read as its corollary).

In all these cases we have the exposition of differences between the geometric (Euclidian) representation and visual space: the impossibility of speaking about a segment without its size being immediately given, the assumption that measurements have a duration (that it is in time) and, finally, the relation between the transitivity presented in the third example and the delimitation of different colors. Immediately given size, time and color are not part of the Euclidian representation of space, but are an inherent part of visual space.

Nevertheless, these initial examples do not seem excessively problematic, because even if they imply that Euclidian geometry is not an accurate representation of visual space, they do not seem to involve a contradiction.

It is a supposed contradiction between visual and Euclidian space, presented by an example in §208f, which occupies the core of Wittgenstein’s investigation from there on, and that, for its size and importance (including its supposed influence on the transformations undergone by Wittgenstein’s philosophy in this period), configures a second stage of the text. The contradiction unfolds from the following problem:
It is obviously possible for the intervals a and b to appear to me to be the same in length and for the segments c and the segments d also to appear to me to be the same in length but for there still to be 25 cs and 24 ds when I count them. And the question arises: how can that be possible? Is it correct to say here: but it is so, and all we see is that visual space does not obey the rules of-say-Euclidian space?\textsuperscript{19}

The problem is that what seems to have “the same measures” in visual space have different measures in Euclidian space, or, in order to make explicit the contradiction, that c=d and 24c=25d is, in this example, true in visual space and false in Euclidian space. However, we must be wary of these preliminary attempts of elucidation presented here, because the problem presented by Wittgenstein is mainly about understanding how to describe what is happening in the example. He presents successive attempts of describing it from §208f to §211. These various attempts come from a single sequence of text in the manuscripts (MS107, 28-36), plus a further analysis of some other examples (§211, which comes from MS107, 212, 168, 172-3). An interesting way of reading this text is to suppose, as a hypothesis, that the author is searching for alternatives to deal with the problem. But that these alternatives are presented because each of them, even the refused ones, bring something relevant to the investigation and later will be elaborated on. This shows us the sense in which the investigation about the concepts of approximation, precision, equality, proximity, limit, among others (§§212 to 215), are a solution to the “paradox”.

We find in §208f a further explanation of the reason why the problem of the measurement in visual space becomes so relevant in the debate:

\textsuperscript{19} Wittgenstein, MS107, 27-36: “This would imply that the question ‘How can that be possible?’ was nonsense and so unjustified. And so there wouldn’t be anything paradoxical in this at all, we would simply have to accept it. But is it conceivable that a should appear equal to b and the cs to the ds, and a visibly different number of cs and ds be present? / Or should I now say that even in visual space something can after all appear different from what it is? Certainly not! Or that n times an interval and n + 1 times the same interval can yield precisely the same result in visual space? That is just as unacceptable. Except if there is no sense at all in saying of intervals in visual space that they are equal. If, that is, in visual space it only made sense to talk of a ‘seeming’ and this expression weren’t only appropriate for the relationship between two independent experiences. And so if there were an absolute seeming. / And so perhaps also an absolute vagueness or an absolute unclarity. (Whereas on my view, something can only be vague or unclear with reference to something we have posited as the standard of clarity: therefore relatively.)”
And the question arises: how can that be possible? Is it correct to say here: but it is so, and all we see is that visual space does not obey the rules of – say – Euclidian space? This would imply that the question “How can that be possible?” was nonsense and so unjustified. And so there wouldn’t be anything paradoxical in this at all, we would simply have to accept it. But is it conceivable that a should appear equal to b and the cs to ds, and a visibly different number of cs and ds be present?

The problem is not any difficulty that results from the relation between Euclidian geometry and visual space. Our answer to such a problem would be just to point out that there is a difference (and that therefore the visual space does not obey the rules of Euclidian geometry) and accept it. The difficult problem that arises here is to identify what, regardless of their relation to Euclidian geometry, is supposed to be a possibility (what is conceivable) in visual space itself. It is to understand if we can recognize in this realm, that a=b, c=d, a=24c, and 25d=b. It is necessary to understanding the multiplicity of visual space, and what makes sense to say in this realm, and not just to present its relation to Euclidian geometry.

The remainder of §208 presents (and refuses) some initial alternatives to eliminate this paradox: it refuses that in visual space “n” may be equal to “n +1”, and that it is possible to distinguish between being and appearance in visual space (which amounts to withholding its immediacy). The possibility of speaking about an absolute seeming and about an absolute vagueness or absolute unclarity is more seriously considered, but the objection is immediate: these are relative terms and so they presuppose a standard.20 Finally, he considers the hypothesis that one cannot speak about quantity (24c and 25d) in visual space, another idea that reappears later as a statement about the nature of the visual space, which dissolves the paradox. The very possibility of relying on counting, and in the permanence and stability of what we count, is pointed out as a difficulty.

We find in §209 a hypothesis about the constitution of the visual space which presents an element that results in the impossibility of a pictorial representation of this space: the eye movements. Because of them, the images appear to us as “blurred” when compared to paintings. In the end, no

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20 Wittgenstein will return to this further alternative, and it is at the basis of its redefinition of the meaning of terms that is proposed in the third part of the chapter.
painted image is able to “adequately represent” visual space (insofar that the movement of the eyes, instead of being itself “definite”, could not be represented in painting). The characterization of the visual image as blurred occurs only because the painted image is arbitrarily chosen as a pattern of correction. The argument is important not for its reference to the movement of the eyes, but because it shows us that we can redefine our vocabulary, and that we can conceive a description in which the idea of an absolute inaccuracy is possible – or rather, that we recognize that certain elements of visual space can not be adequately presented in a certain representation system.

Another important possibility, which brings with it another sense in which we should correct our representation of the multiplicity of visual space, is presented in §210, which deals with the possibility of using “construction arguments”. Two alternative ways to deal with the “contradictions” that arise “when we apply the methods of inference used in Euclidian space to visual space” (§210a) are presented: the refusal of arguments by construction in the visual space (§210, from MS107, 33-36) and the refusal of the possibility of “measurement” (in a quite particular sense) in visual space (§214, from MS108, 39-45).

The first argument begins with a translation of the problem about 24c & 25d into a construction problem:

I mean: it is possible to carry through a construction (i.e. a chain of inference) in visual space in which we appreciate every step (transition), but whose result contradicts our geometrical concepts. (§210b)

In this new context, the argument proceeds by refusing the possibility of such a construction for its piecemeal character\(^{21}\), which “do not add up to a visual whole”.

The following example about our apprehension of a spherical surface seems to make clear what is in question:

This would be something that happens when I show someone a small section of a large spherical surface and ask him whether he accepts the great circle which is visible on it as a straight line; and if he did so, I would then rotate the sphere and show him that it came back to

\(^{21}\) “Now I believe this happens because we can only see the construction piecemeal and not as one whole. The explanation would then consist in saying that there isn’t a visual construction at all that is composed of these individual visual pieces.”, Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, §210c.
the same place on the circle. But I haven’t proved to him in this way that a straight line in visual space returns to meet itself.

The point here, stressed also in several other parts of Chapter XX, is not to prove that visual space presents something false or “only” appearances. It is, again, the presentation of the difference in the multiplicity of visual and Euclidian space – or, in other words, that there are some possibilities in Euclidian space that are not present in visual space (and v.v.), for example, to differentiate a and b, or c and d, in the example presented above.

The geometry of visual space has a different multiplicity from the geometry of Euclidian space. We must not replace ‘equal’ by ‘equal’, ‘parallel’ by ‘parallel’, ‘straight’ by ‘straight’.²²

The fact that the geometry of visual space is not Euclidian (which is said by Wittgenstein several times) does not imply its falsity, but only the necessity of making clear that we cannot suppose that Euclidian concepts (of equality, parallelism, etc) may be applied to visual space (and v.v.). This seems to be why the text presents, from §213 to the end, an investigation about the “new concepts” necessary to talk about visual space.

The second argument that dispels the apparent paradox is a consequence of the refusal that there is measurement in visual space. We find here, still, a problem about “what distinctions are there in visual space” (214), about its particular multiplicity. Wittgenstein says that our usual attribution of quantities (when, for example, we say that in visual space there are 24c) do not make sense in this context:

The question is: is there a sense in speaking of a hundred-sided polygon? Or: Does it make sense to talk of thirty strokes in a row taken in at one look? I believe there is none.

If this is so, even in the case of our not proceeding by construction in the presentation of the paradox, we could not say (or, better, it would not make sense to say) that a=24c, or that b=25d, or that there are 24c or 25d. And so, the paradoxical conclusion does not follow.

²² WWK, 59-60.
In some later notes, from MS107, gathered in §211, Wittgenstein tries to understand the sense of attributing an imprecise and approximate character to the experience of visual space. The concept of inaccuracy would apply, according to the conception outlined initially, since we apply these concepts to our immediate experience, and so this would be presented “as rough and vague in relation to our techniques of representation” (§211b).

The problem of using these concepts, however, is that we use them in a quite different sense from that which they have in our own measurement techniques. The difficulty is explained by an example in which Wittgenstein presents a model for the correlation between Euclidian geometry and visual space (we can understand this as an alternative model of representation, the “vibrating circle”): what corresponds to a circle in Euclidian space is a set of pictures, defined, for example, by means of a band “which arises through the vibration of a circle” (§211e). The problem that becomes evident here is that we have not only an inaccuracy, a difference of multiplicity in what is called a circle in visual space, compared with the circle of Euclidian geometry, but this difference can not itself be demarcated accurately\(^{23}\), and therefore also the “vibrating circle” is not an adequate representation of the multiplicity of visual space. Its boundaries, even if defined in terms of a band, are set arbitrarily\(^{24}\) (and this is not the case in our experience of the visual space).

This figure shows the problem with this way of conceiving the relation between Euclidian geometry and visual space: we might be able to continuously reduce the range of indeterminacy, so that we could ‘approach indefinitely close to a limit between what I see as C and what I see as not C’ (presented in quotes in §212a).

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But on the other hand, I shall never be able to draw such a limit as a curve in Euclidian space, for if I could, it would itself then have to belong to one of the two classes and be the last member of this class, in which case I would have to be able to see a Euclidian curve after all.

We have two distinct conceptions of precision at work here, and the sense in which one can speak of inaccuracy and precision in visual space is not the same as found in Euclidian space:

If I cannot see an exact circle then in this sense neither can I see approximations to one. – But then the Euclidian circle--and the Euclidian approximation to one – is in this sense not an object of my perception at all, but, say, only a different logical construction which could be obtained from the objects of a quite different space from the space of immediate vision. / But even this way of talking is misleading, and we must rather say that we see the Euclidian circle in a different sense. (§212e-f)

This remark ends with a direct answer to the problem that began to be discussed in §208:

In visual space there is no measurement. / We could, e.g., perfectly well give the following definitions for visual space: ‘A straight line is one that isn’t curved’ and ‘A circle is a curve with constant curvature’.

The point is to understand that the concepts of line and circle used to talk about visual space are different from those of Euclidian geometry, in the same way that the concept of precision is not the same in both cases. This debate plays the role of transition from considerations about measurement in visual space and explanations of the different multiplicity it has in relation to Euclidian geometry to a series of more general questions, which encompass the above, indicating that the origin of the difficulties we found was the use of an inappropriate vocabulary (the Euclidian vocabulary).

We need new concepts and we continually resort to those of the language of physical objects. The word ‘precision’ is one of these dubious expressions. In ordinary language it refers to a comparison and
then it is quite intelligible. Where a certain degree of imprecision is present, perfect precision is also possible. But what is it supposed to mean when I say I can never see a precise circle, and am now using this word not relatively, but absolutely? (§213)

The use of the concepts circle, accuracy, and also see, like, close, when they relate to visual space, or in particular situations in which we speak about visual space, has a specific nature that needs to be explained - and Chapter XX tries to do this in a preliminary way. The investigations presented here by Wittgenstein resemble the descriptions of language games that will appear later in his work. What it makes clear is that the difference between the multiplicity of visual space and that of Euclidian space must be addressed through the establishment of new concepts (“we need new concepts and we continually resort to those of the language of physical objects”), so that which is presented as inaccuracy is the consideration of visual space from the perspective of Euclidian space (and this poses the limits of this representation as a problem, or even the “idealization” that lies at its base, as discussed, albeit briefly, in Chapter, XXII).

Being & Appearance

To conclude these remarks, we may note that Nielsen’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s talk with Schlick and Waismann on December 30, 1929, that is, that Wittgenstein is here making clear that he abandons his early conception of a phenomenological language, is not acceptable. The text is the following:

25 ‘The use of the same word ‘equal’ with quite different meanings is very confusing. This is the typical case of words and phrases which originally referred to the ‘things’ of the idioms for talking about physical objects, the ‘bodies in space’, being applied to the elements of our visual field; in the course of this they inevitably change their meanings utterly and statements which previously had had a sense now lose it and others which had had no sense in the first way of speaking now acquire one. Even though a certain analogy does persist--just the one which tricks us into using the same expression.”, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, §213e

26 Cf. e.g. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, §213f: “It is, e.g., important that the word ‘close’ means something different in the proposition ‘There is a red patch close to the boundary of the visual field’ and in such a proposition as ‘The red patch in the visual field is close to the brown one’. Furthermore the word ‘boundary’ in the first proposition also has a different meaning--and is a different sort of word from ‘boundary’ in the proposition: ‘the boundary between red and blue in the visual field is a circle’.”
The essential thing is that we use two languages, a language of visual space and a language of Euclidian space, giving the language of Euclidian space priority. Language indicates this difference by using ‘being’ and ‘appearing’. Thus we say of two stretches in visual space that they appear but are not equal. Or of a short arc of a circle that it appears straight, although it is curved. And so on. In this non-Euclidian structure of visual space makes itself manifest.

This is not an exposition of Wittgenstein’s conceptions. First of all, because this implies a simple inversion in the relation of priority between phenomenological and ordinary (or Euclidian) language, which is extremely different from the refusal of the possibility of a phenomenological language. Wittgenstein is not here affirming the distinction between two languages. He is just recognizing it in our language, recognizing that our use of “being” and “appearing” presents a distinction and a priority relation.

The argument that follows, that what is seen as equal or parallel in visual space is not necessarily described this way in Euclidian space, does not seem to imply the conclusion that there is no phenomenological language.

Now the truth about the experiment with parallels is this:

We see a//a’, b//b’…n//n’. From this we can conclude only this one thing: that the word ‘parallel’ with respect to the visual field means something different (has a different syntax) from what it means with respect to Euclidian space. … We need a method of projection for representing in the language of Euclidian geometry this state of affairs in the visual field, and the method of projection consists in our use of the words ‘it appears’.  

27 WWK, 59.
28 WWK, 59-60.
It seems clear that, as already indicated above, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibilities (and impossibilities), or the multiplicity, in the phenomenological domain, and so, it is part of a phenomenological investigation. The question, even after the refusal of the possibility of a phenomenological language, is to understand how to represent visual space in ordinary language, what is necessary only in the context of a particular language, and what does not depend on any particular language.

6. Phenomenology

There are two questions that, despite not being our theme here, are closely related to it, and briefly presenting them is relevant. The first one is about Wittgenstein's phenomenological project after October 1929. In the second half of 1929, he abandons the project of a phenomenological language, but not the project of a phenomenology. This project of a phenomenological investigation, presented in Philosophical Remarks, §1, deals exactly with the multiplicity (or the possibilities) of the phenomenon to be represented in ordinary language. We can identify here a clear distinction between the project of constructing a phenomenological language, explicitly refused by Wittgenstein in 1929, after Some Remarks on Logical Form, and the project of a phenomenological investigation of ordinary language, presented in the beginning of the Philosophical Remarks, which is conceived as the grasping of the essence of what is represented and so of “immediate experience”. This project is still present in The Big Typescript.

29 “Although Wittgenstein quickly abandoned the project of constructing a phenomenological language that directly corresponded to the phenomenal world of immediate experience, he had not given up on the idea of phenomenology”, Thompson, Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience, p. 89. Cf. also D. Stern’s Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, on the different uses of a phenomenological language.

30 “His present conception of phenomenology does not purport to deal directly with the phenomena themselves; rather it attempts to grasp immediate experience in its possibility, i.e. being able to grasp its (their) essence(s)”, Thompson, Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience, p. 90

31 « L’on ne peut en particulier comprendre la signification et la portée de l’abandon fin 1929 du projet de recherche d’une langue primaire au sens général sans comprendre d’abord ce qui rend celle-ci apte à jouer le rôle d’une langue unique de référence dans la quelle pourraient être retraduits tous nos énoncés ordinaires », L. Soutif, Wittgenstein et le problème de l’espace visuel, p. 119-120
From this perspective, the problem in Philosophical Remarks, §208, does not seem to be related to the project of constructing a phenomenological language (conceived as the construction of an artificial language with the adequate multiplicity to present the immediately given). It remains as a part of the phenomenological project of “correcting” ordinary language, of presenting the multiplicity of the phenomenon through an analysis of the visual space.

Instead of the abandonment of the project of replacing ordinary language with a phenomenological language, without misunderstandings and flaws, we find ourselves still in a “revisionary” context in which grammar is not autonomous: it “answers” to the phenomenon it tries to represent in an adequate way. It is through this investigation that the revision of ordinary language is realized. What is called here a “revision” consists only in the critique that makes the difference in multiplicity between ordinary language and the phenomenon clear.

The abandonment of the recourse to an “immediately given” will happen only later, when the autonomy of grammar is conceived and results in the complete substitution of the phenomenological investigation for the investigation of language games.

7. Philosophical Remarks’ Chapters on Phenomenology

Chapters XX-XXII of Philosophical Remarks constitute a set that can be identified, in general terms, as the book’s phenomenological research. The relation between the investigation of language and phenomenology was treated in a preliminary way by Wittgenstein, particularly in Chapter I and throughout the exposition of the concepts of language and analysis that follows it (especially Chapter VIII). But the exposition presented in this context intends only to clarify the elements that characterize his conception of language. After presenting this conception, between Chapters II and IX, and of a parallel exposition of meaning in mathematics, in Chapters X to XIX, the book unfolds in a properly phenomenological research, the nature of which is discussed in the following chapters.
of which is anticipated by the first paragraphs of the book. It is thematized again, in more general terms, in the first half of Chapter XXII. Chapters XX and XXI configure then those “chapters of our grammar” mentioned in §3 of the book.33

So, we have here the development of the claim that logic is concerned with our language, presented early in the book, and that the analysis consists of an explanation of the grammar of a proposition, and in particular the claim that there isn’t a primary phenomenological language, although the phenomenological investigation maintains its centrality.

All that is possible and necessary is to separate what is essential from what is inessential in our language. / That is, if we so to speak describe the class of languages which serve their purpose, then in so doing we have shown what is essential to them and given an immediate representation of immediate experience. / Each time I say that, instead of such and such a representation, you could also use this other one, we take a further step towards the goal of grasping the essence of what is represented. / A recognition of what is essential and what inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of which parts of our language are wheels turning idly, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language (§1).

What we find in Chapters XX and XXI is precisely the investigation of that which “serve their purpose”, of what is essential in the representation of immediate experience, and of the alternative representation that present themselves to us, or which we could conceive. A description of this project, which is certainly not clearly understandable at first, is resumed and elaborated at the beginning of Chapter XXII (§§225-227). There the way the Philosophical Remarks conceives the project of a logical analysis of language is exposed. Propositions, even simple propositions like “there’s a chair here” are presented as hypotheses, i.e., they have only a loose connection (loresen) with reality (looser than verification - §227), and therefore they present “varying degrees of freedom” in its relation to it. Accordingly, the concepts of meaning, verification and nonsense are redefined. On the one hand, the lack of sense is conceived as the absence of any connection between proposition

33 “The words “Colour”, “Sound”, “Number” etc. could appear in the chapter headings of our grammar. They need not occur within the chapters but that is where their structure is given”; Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, §3c.
and reality. On the other, the propositions “in no matter how complicated a way, still in the end refer to immediate experience” (§225b, italics added).

The characterization of this “loose” connection with reality, or with the phenomenon (since the phenomenon “is reality” (§225g)), is perhaps the most important element to understanding the nature of phenomenological research and analysis in Philosophical Remarks. The text insists in characterizing a partial, limited connection: it only occurs “in some sense or other”, and confirms only “some facet of them” (§225c). The statement that we verify only one facet of the proposition is explained by the example of the proposition that says that there is a chair here, inasmuch as this statement says something very different from the image of the chair that we see (precisely because we see only one facet of the chair). In this same sense, the proposition is presented as a law for forming expectations and that, in these terms, it is a method of representation of immediate experience. The context in which we find ourselves, then, is that of evaluating various alternative methods, different attempts to represent reality, none verifiable, and among which the only criterion of choice proposed is its degree of simplicity (a certainly problematic concept, as the subsequent treatment of the subject by Wittgenstein will make clear).

What is essential to a hypothesis is, I believe, that it arouses an expectation by admitting of future confirmation. That is, it is of the essence of a hypothesis that its confirmation is never completed. When I say a hypothesis isn’t definitively verifiable, that doesn’t mean that there is a verification of it which we may approach ever more nearly, without ever reaching it. That is nonsense--of a kind into which we frequently lapse. No, a hypothesis simply has a different formal relation to reality from that of verification. (Hence, of course, the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ are also inapplicable here, or else have a different meaning). (§228)

The distinction between what is essential and what is not essential in our language, the identification of what is turning idly, consists in this critique of the methods of representation, in explaining what concerns them, and what concerns the phenomenon that we try to represent, and in explaining how this representation “achieves its purpose” and presents to us the immediate experience to which it refers. The result of this criticism is an immediate representation of experience (§1c).
Chapters XX and XXI present, then, systems of representation of visual space and colors, as well as their limitations and, eventually, the alternatives to them. In the case of colors, where this becomes clearer, they present the limits of color representation by a circle or an octahedron, as well as of other alternatives to them - a straight line or two inverted cones (or two inverted octagonal pyramids). The point is to show the limits of these systems of representation and explain that they present relations that are not conceivable in the phenomena (such as color which is at the “angle of 90°” of violet), or that there are other relations that they are not able to represent (as the unique character of red, and of the other pure colors), or even that each of them maintains some relations and not others. This critique of the systems of representation is not, in itself, something problematic, and it is announced from the first paragraph of the book. It only makes clear “how difficult it is to describe what it is that we really see” (§208), a difficulty about which Wittgenstein recurrently talks. It also shows the relevance of a phenomenological critique of grammar. To different models of representation of colors correspond, thus, the different lines in the drawing that illustrates §226, in which Wittgenstein tries to represent a curve by different dotted lines (a line, a parabola, a sinusoid):

Another important issue addressed at the beginning of Chapter XXII is the circumstantial justification of the phenomenological research, and the qualification of the relation between phenomenon and reality. The recourse to a phenomenology is justified in the context of project of analysis. Insofar as the simple objects of the Tractatus are presented as unanalyzable, as the last stage of the analysis, everything hypothetical is excluded, including physical theories, such as atomism, otherwise the truth of these hypotheses becomes a condition for the meaning of the words. The phenomena, the immediate impressions, present themselves as good candidates for the role of final
elements of the analysis, insofar as they are limited to that which is immediate, not involving anything hypothetical. According to the text:

The point of talking of sense-data and immediate experience is that we’re after a description that has nothing hypothetical in it. (§226)

The Philosophical Remarks presents the project of an analysis of propositions (hypothetical therefore complex) under the immediate experiences that relate to them, even though in the “loose” form characterized above. From this perspective, the abandonment of the project of a phenomenological language, although of central importance, can be described as the result of understanding that no representation of the phenomena will be fully adequate. Then we must work to make explicit what is necessary only because of its grammar, and what is necessary regardless of a specific grammar, in the domain of the phenomenon itself, and finally, the differences of multiplicity between phenomena and systems of representation. Therefore, the abandonment of this project does not characterize a major difficulty to the main project conceived in the beginning of 1929 and does not diminish the relevance of phenomenological investigation. The big break occurs at the moment this project of a phenomenological critique of grammar is replaced by a conception of grammar that no longer responds to the phenomena, but that happens to be designed as fully autonomous.

Accordingly, Chapter XX handles differences and eventually contradictions between visual space and the geometric representation of space as is shown by Euclidian geometry (or by some slight variation of it). Chapter XXI has a similar purpose, and addresses the specificities of the color space and the various systems of representation through which we try to represent it. Chapter XXII, in its turn, presents a balance of this phenomenological investigation and of the whole Philosophical Remarks. Chapters XX and XXI intend to identify what is necessary only because of the grammar of the means of representation we use to represent space and colors and what is a condition of meaning associated with the phenomenon itself. Therefore, this research presents the distinction between two kinds of necessity - a necessity associated with the grammar of our representation and a necessity which is independent of any specific forms of representation, and that lies in the phenomenon.

The analysis found in these chapters leads to a critique of language, of the systems of representation, and to an explanation of what in it refers
to the real (to the phenomenon), and what is necessary only in virtue of the grammar. Insofar as the chapters are dedicated to this research, they form the core of the phenomenological investigation of Phenomenological Remarks.  

8. Conclusion

To conclude, we may observe, first, that the arguments presented in the beginning of MS107, considered above, do not play a central role in Wittgenstein’s criticism of the project of a phenomenological language. On the contrary, it is part of another kind of investigation, kept until later, and still present in The Big Typescript, which we call here a “phenomenological investigation”, proposed as the procedure through which ordinary language is corrected (in the multiplicity of its terms). It seems quite plausible that these notes are posterior to Wittgenstein’s conclusion that it’s not possible to have a language without a hypothetical element, associated with his considerations about time.

Beyond this, these texts do not present a dilemma, but a series of difficulties that make evident that, in Wittgenstein’s words, “the visual image is much more complicated than it seems to be at first glance” (§209). It is also important to note that we do not find here a simple opposition to a non-Euclidian characterization of visual space, but, in its place, objections against some attributions of measure to visual space and to the use of construction proofs, which have, inevitably, a temporal (and, then, a hypothetical) element.

What seems more relevant to the study of this period of Wittgenstein’s work is the understanding of the incompatibility between this phenomenological-revisionist project and the idea of autonomy of grammar (and this tension is strong in The Big Typescript).

34 Another question that is necessary to consider briefly is about the reasons for Wittgenstein to give up the project of a primary language. Prado Neto’s Fenomenologia em Wittgenstein presents an interesting answer, particularly because it also indicates some further considerations about Chapter XX. According to him, the difficulties Wittgenstein has with the analysis of time are the “official” reason that lead him to abandon the project of a phenomenological language: “It becomes clear that these difficulties about the analysis of time are what ‘officially’ led Wittgenstein to abandon the project of a phenomenological language”; p. 53.
This is also the key to understanding the problems in Nielsen’s supposition of a *phenomenological language argument*, since his interpretation makes the rupture between language and world seem much more strong and definitive than what we found in the *Philosophical Remarks*, because it cannot be conciliated with the supposition of an *immediately given*, clearly still present. Maybe we can also add that the visual space is not private or internal, even though it is strictly associated with the heritage of a tractarian solipsism.

Beyond this, we can identify both a central reference to the immediately given in Wittgenstein’s conception of analysis in the *Remarks* and, with it, to a phenomenological critique of language, and an organized structure in the book. It is usually overlooked by the readings that suppose the book presents only a series of notes and the traces of Wittgenstein’s rapid change of conceptions in 1929-30. Even in the frequent case of the remarks which come from a moment in which he was still pursuing the construction of a phenomenological language, the use he makes of this material is quite different, and he situates these notes in the new context of his conceptions of the beginning of 1930. In the case that we considered here, the *Philosophical Remarks* presents, through the organization of previous remarks, a well-structured investigation (or, at least, much more structured than is usually recognized) of the phenomenology of visual space and its implications, which are not related to the construction of a phenomenological language.

**References**


