Belief as an impression of reflection on David Hume’s Philosophy

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Published: Dec 30, 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32334/oqnfp.2025n57a1054
Keywords:
Hume, Belief, Impressions of reflection, Knowledge

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Carlota Salgadinho
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio De Janeiro (PUC-Rio)
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7968-9063

Abstract

In this paper, I present an interpretation of the place of belief in Hume's epistemology. To this end, I begin by introducing the definitions of belief offered by the philosopher (section 1). I then explain the questions that these definitions have raised among commentators (section 2). Next, I discuss the interpretation that belief is defined by the force and vividness of an idea, exploring its inconsistencies (section 3). Finally, I propose that, in order to resolve them, in Humean philosophy, belief should be understood as an impression of reflection (section 4).

Article Details

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Vol. 33 No. 57 (2025): Beyond Dualism: Configurations of the Body in Modernity
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Author Biography

Carlota Salgadinho, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio De Janeiro (PUC-Rio)

Adjunct Professor in the Department of Philosophy at PUC-Rio (2020–). She is currently conducting research in the field of the History of Modern Philosophy, with an emphasis on the intersection between Hume’s ethics and epistemology. At the same time, she maintains an interest in the philosophies of Aristotle, Malebranche, Locke, Kant, and Wittgenstein, as well as in contemporary metaethics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. She is a research associate at NUPEM (Center for Modern Thought) at PUC-Rio/CNPq, the Hume Group at UFMG/CNPq, and the Modern Skepticism Group at UFMG/CNPq. She is a permanent member of the Hume Working Group at Anpof. Associate member of the philosophical association Scientiae Studia, ABES18 (Brazilian Association for 18th-Century Studies), and SBFA (Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy).

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