The Leibnizian reformulation of the ontological argument. From certainty to probability

Abstract

This paper addresses Leibniz’s reformulation of the ontological argument according to its Cartesian version, as well as the different attitudes Leibniz assumed to his own attempts of reformulation. As is known, he objects that Descartes has not proved the consistency of God’s concept, letting the proof incomplete. From the Paris period onwards, he endeavors to prove the possibility of God’s concept through different ways of arguments. Thus, his attempts go through three stages. Firstly, he reworks the ontological proof departing from the concept of the most perfect being. The second phase is rather apologetic and depends mainly on the concept of a necessary being. The third stage reveals his cautious attitude toward the possibility of accomplishing entirely the argument, even if he attributes to it a moral certainty. Here, we will focus on the main arguments of the first stage and will propose a hypothesis about the reasons why Leibniz conferred a purely moral certainty on the argument.