Original Transcendence and Possibilization: Concerning the Problem of Intentionality in Fundamental Ontology
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Abstract
This paper hypothesis is that despite Heidegger’s acknowledgment on the relevance of intentionality, he subordinates it to the notion of transcendence, while displacing its justification to the formal-transcendental ontological realm. Considering this, I investigate the scope of a more radical intentionality, as announced by Heidegger, inasmuch as he situates it in the structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. The paper concludes with an analysis of transcendence and intentionality from the vantage point of foundation and dependence relations.
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