Montaigne’s skepticism and tolerance

Abstract

Montaigne’s skepticism in the practical and moral realms is characterized by the lack of criteria or rules of conduct so that one could attain a general pattern of behavior or tradition. The period in which he lived was propitious to reinforce the following scenario: the religious wars in France and all over Europe and the discovery of the peoples in the New World were fundamental factors for the growth of philosophical doubts regarding individual behavior and organized society. Nevertheless, Montaigne denounces the cruelties committed in his time, whether among the indigenous people or between Catholics and Protestants, and often argues in favor of freedom of conscience and opinion. In this paper I will show that Montaigne’s Philosophy, despite his skepticism, is susceptible to a general idea of tolerance that traspasses different peoples and individuals, even though the concept of tolerance is not systematized in his writings and such a defense seems incompatible with a certain kind of skepticism.